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   Abstract  
 
The COVID 19 pandemic has affected the entire world, and it is continuing to spread morbidity, mortality, and chaos. 
The second line of health care workers who are not treating the COVID 19 infected patients also plays a significant role 
during this pandemic by treating other diseases and screening for COVID 19 infection. Nevertheless, many of them still 
struggle to identify and understand their role, lost between the idea of self-protection and principles of medical ethics. 
This article is trying to break the ice by solving a few common conundrums based on India's experiences.  
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Background  
The COVID 19 pandemic, which broke out on 31st December 
2019 in Wuhan, China [1], has invaded all the continents 
globally, sparing the only Antarctic at the earth's south pole [2]. 
To date, it has infected 2.9 million of the population in over 
more than two hundred nations, taking over nine million lives 
[3]. It has affected every single domain worldwide, including 
the social, economic, professional, psychological, and physical 
wellbeing. The front line health care workers are doing a 
commendable job all over the world in treating infected 
patients. Let us simulate this pandemic to war in the eighteenth 
century. Just like there were no long-distance war weapons to 
destroy the opponent's warhead, this pandemic also lacks a 
single powerful weapon to seize and demolish the virus. During 
such wars, tactical line infantry was applied [4]. While the line 
infantry focused on the heavy front-line combat, light cavalry 
soldiers called skirmishers or militia were deployed to occupy a 
tactical position and protect the larger body of friendly troops 
from the enemy squads' advancement. They were deployed in 
an irregular open formation to engage the enemy with light 
combats and thus delay their movement and weaken their 
morale [5]. While the line infantry soldiers had definite 
objectives and a proper action plan to achieve them, the light 
infantry fought in grey zones of objectives, tactics, and plan. 
The second line of health care workers who are not directly 
involved in treating the COVID 19 patients are like these 
skirmishers who operate in grey zones. 
     India is the second most affected country by COVID 19 
invasion, with 5.12 million people infected and eighty-three 
thousand people losing their lives to the pandemic. Kerala state, 
which has the highest literacy rate and the doctor-patient ratio in 
the country, is in a comparatively better state with just more 
than a lakh infected people and less than five hundred deaths 
[6]. The government medical colleges, along with the support of 
a few tertiary health care centers, manage the COVID 19 
patients in the state at this stage. The rest of the doctors and the 
health care facilities, which are the second line health care 
teams, refer COVID 19 infected patients to the treating centers 
if they come across any.  
 
Problems faced by the Second line HCWs   
The second line of health care workers (HCWs) faces multiple 
practical problems, which swing between self-protection and 
professional ethics, rights, and duties. The questions that storm 
inside their brains are: 
a. How long is this pandemic going to last? 
b. Am I at real risk? 
c. How long should I continue to take protective measures? 
d. Being COVID 19 infected or exposed, how is it going to 
affect me and others? 
e. Is taking adequate self-protection a right or a duty?  
f. Is stepping back professionally ethical? 
g. How do I balance protection measures and professional 
ethics? 
h. What can I do in limited settings? 
After the brainstorming, even after being adequately informed 
and educated about the menace, most of us cease to act 
appropriately and adequately, exposing us to an immense risk of 
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infection. A psychological behavior is called 'willful ignorance', 
' self-deception', or 'tactical stupidity'. However, as Aldous 
Huxley once said, "Facts do not cease to exist because they are 
ignored." Moliere adds that " A learned fool is more a fool than 
an ignorant fool". 
 
Risk among HCWs  
Data analysis from the COVID 19 statistics from the USA 
shows that the mortality rate among the COVID 19 infected 
HCWs is the same as that of the general population [7]. 
However, the analysis also shows that the mean age of the 
infected HCWs was much lower than the general population, 
and the mortality rate among the younger age group is much 
higher in HCWs [8,9]. The statistical facts are not different in 
India [10]. Thus, the available data proves that HCWs are at 
more risk of infection and death from COVID 19 infection than 
the general population. The probable additional risk factors for 
the HCWs are: 
a. Increased duration of exposure. 
b. Increased viral load of exposure. 
c. Multiple sources of infection. 
d. Close contact with the infected patient and his fluids. 
e. Poorly ventilated and crowded area of work. 
f. Inadequate nutrition. 
g. Inadequate rest. 
h. Lack of adequate protective equipment. 
We need to remember that, 
Effective infection= Exposure time x Virus load, with the 
contribution of the 'Immunity factor'. 
 
The impact of the infection   
Once infected, it has an impact on ourselves and the people 
around us. The infection will have its impact on the social, 
physical, and mental states of the HCW by effecting: 
a. Physical illness. 
b. Psychological discomfort. 
c. Quarantine and isolation from the family members. 
d. Lost working days. 
e. Financial burden. 
f. The stigma of the public. 
 
Right or duty?  
As researchers and participants' safety is concerned, IRB should 
There are many high-risk categories of people around us whose 
defense depends on our decisions. They are: 
a. At home- Elderly, Children, Pregnant ladies, Family 
members with chronic diseases. 
b. At work- Colleagues, Patients with immuno-compromised 
illnesses, chronic diseases, and multi-organ dysfunctions. 
     If we down our guard and expose ourselves to the infection, 
we can act as carriers of the disease to these high-risk categories 
of people. We might sound brave in facing the disease with our 
bare hands, but our foolishness and negligence do not give us 
any right to harm our fellow beings. Our patient comes to us to 
get a cure for his illness, assuming that we have taken adequate 
precautions to not cause any harm to him. After all, 'Do no 
harm' is the basic and the most vital principle of medical ethics. 
So, taking adequate protection against the infection is more of a 
duty than a right for an HCW. 
 
Stepping down- Self-protection v/s professional ethics:  
If we do not have any chronic medical condition that puts us at 
higher risk than others in procuring the infection, stepping 
down from our clinical practice in the present situation would 
demand more input from the health care professionals and 
might be considered professionally unethical in many eyes. 
However, those HCWs who work at multiple areas and health 
facilities need to contain themselves in a single health care 
center. Working in various centers located at different 
geographical areas increases his chance of exposure, but he also 
will act as a carrier of the virus from one geographical location 
to another and thus be a super spreader of the disease. At the 
same time, he would be compromising multiple health care 
facilities in these needy times. The high-risk contacts of that 
HCW in all the facilities would need to go for quarantine, 
compromising the manpower and thus the function of those 
health care facilities. As far as we make ourselves available at a 
single, approachable center for our patients to consult us if 
required, then stepping down is an intelligent, tactical, logical, 
and ethical decision that we all need to take. 
 
What can we do in limited settings?  
There are a few fundamental principles that we need to follow 
as a health care provider. The first and foremost of those is to 
stop being a high-risk contact. Contact for a health care worker 
is considered to be of high risk if he had, 
a.  Direct physical contact with a confirmed case without PPE 
b. Occupy a position within 2m of a confirmed case without 
adequate protection for more than 15 minutes 
c. Indirect contact by touching the body fluids of a confirmed 
case without protection [11].  
      It means that to avoid being a high-risk contact; we need to 
have proper personal protection equipment, including face 
shield/ goggles, face mask, and hand gloves whenever we face a 
patient. We need to sanitize our hands even though we were 
wearing hand gloves. Additional protection equipment needs to 
be used depending on the procedure conducted, e.g., 
nebulization, endoscopic procedures, surgeries, cardio-
pulmonary resuscitation, etc. 
     Keep adequate physical distance from the patient expect 
during the physical examination. Allow only a single bystander 
to enter the consultation room along with the patient, that too 
only if the situation demands, e.g., elderly, children, pregnant 
ladies, physically unstable patient, patients who need assistance 
for mobilization, etc. All the patients and their bystanders need 
to wear a face mask properly. Always carry minimal accessories 
to the workplace, and once done, make sure to sanitize the 
accessories. If the hospital or clinic provides an adequate 
facility, HCW needs to change clothes to scrubs before starting 
the consultation and take a shower after the consultation, and 
before changing back to the routine clothes. Otherwise, the 
health personnel need to go to the bathroom as soon as he 
reaches home and, before touching any object, should take a 
shower and put his clothes for washing. This will help in 
protecting the other house members from getting infected up to 
an extent. 
Steam inhalation, hypertonic saline gargle, and saline nasal 
wash can be considered after work, even though various studies 
debate the protective power of these measures against COVID 
19 [12,13]. Studies show that epithelial cells mount an antiviral 
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effect by producing hypochlorous acid (HOCl) from chloride 
ions [14]. HCWs should always try to have adequate nutrition, 
hydration, and rest, especially while working hard in the midst 
of a pandemic. 
 
Safety precautions and screening in the institution  
The precautions that we need to take depend on our area of 
activity. Most of the second line HCWs work in either hospital     
or health clinics.  
a. Hospital 
The stakeholders in a hospital are the medical team, patients, 
and hospital administration. Lack of a proper screening method 
and precautions will lead to increased exposure to the virus and 
thus increase the disease's spread. As most of the secondary 
hospitals do not have prior experience and thus a pre-set plan to 
take care of such contagious diseases, it will take time to 
convince everyone about the need of having such a system in 
place. When asked about the precaution and the screening plant 
to be set up in a hospital, the knee jerk reflex response of most 
of them will be not to take any suspected patients and thus, to 
refer them to a COVID 19 treatment centre directly. That might 
sound like a perfect plan to protect the hospital and its 
employees as well as the other patients from any danger 
inflicted by the virus exposure and the infection. 
However, that is a response without any foresight. As COVID 
19 infection can manifest with various symptoms that can 
mimic many other common conditions, the clinical decision 
always roams around in a misty area of chaos. Moreover, if we 
do not want to take any chance at all, then the 'suspected cases' 
will constitute a major share of the total patient population. This 
'refer all' plan will have a tremendously adverse effect on each 
of the stakeholders described below:  
1. Hospital administration: - Under the plan mentioned above, 
many patients will get referred from the hospital. Once word of 
mouth spreads that the hospital is not admitting most of the 
patients in their outpatient or the inpatient departments, the rest 
of the patients also feel reluctant to go to that particular 
hospital. This will bring a massive financial crisis to the 
hospital. 
2. The medical team: - The suspected patients will include 
many patients with chronic illnesses, especially the ones with 
chronic respiratory diseases, which used to take treatment from 
a medical team for the last many years. Referring them away in 
such a situation will destroy their trust in that medical team. The 
financial crisis faced by the hospital administration will slowly 
meltdown on the hospital staff. 
3. Patients: - Referring to all the suspects will deny proper 
treatment for many patients who present with overlapping 
symptoms. It will add to their difficulty, morbidity, and 
mortality.  
     Once convinced about the need for a proper plan, the first 
and most crucial step to be taken is to set up a 'triage' lead by 
trained and educated medical professionals, mostly nurses. 
Remember that if the gate is not guarded well, the fort will fall 
in no time. The next step is to set up a small clinic near the 
triage area, which can be called a 'Fever clinic' to avoid the 
patients' stigma. Any suspicious patients who need to consult in 
any outpatient departments can be directed to this fever clinic 
where a doctor with all the personal protection equipment (PPE) 
will attend to them. The particular consultant they wanted to 
consult with can be contacted over the phone, and the 
instructions can be followed. If that consultant wants to attend 
to the patient, he can do that in the fever clinic with proper PPE. 
Medications can be given for the illness, and the patient should 
be advised to get evaluated for COVID 19 infection at that time 
itself or later if the symptoms are not getting better. Once the 
COVID 19 infection is ruled out, the patient can attend the 
normal outpatient department after that. Only urgent and 
unavoidable investigations, if at all warranted, need to be done 
for the patients attending the fever clinic to avoid exposure of 
the radiology technician, lab staff, other patients, etc.  
     A ward called 'Infectious disease ward' needs to admit the 
suspected patients who require inpatient care. There should be 
separate rooms for each patient to avoid cross-infection. A 
proper donning and doffing area should be set up. It will be 
better if one or two rooms of this ward can be converted to a 
semi-ICU with ventilator and monitoring facilities. Instead of 
that, if the hospital has multiple ICUs, one can be dedicated to 
the suspected patients. The patients can be directly admitted to 
this ward from the triage protecting the emergency department 
from exposure. All the medical staff, including the doctors who 
attend the patients in this ward, need to wear proper PPE. One 
bystander needs to stay with the patient without going out of the 
room, and another person needs to stay outside the ward to 
bring medications, food, etc. X-ray and ECG should be done 
only if warranted as an emergency. Blood samples can be 
collected by the staff nurse and handed over to the lab. Throat 
swab should be sent immediately for COVID 19 evaluation. 
Once the result comes positive, he should be referred to a 
COVID 19 treatment facility, and if negative, he can be shifted 
to the normal ward or ICU depending on the patient's clinical 
condition. This action plan is briefed in Figure 1. 
    In the future, if the existing COVID 19 treatment facilities 
get completely consumed, all other health care facilities might 
need to step in. Having a planned facility, as mentioned before, 
will come in handy in such a situation as everyone knows the 
basic rules and plan in managing contagious diseases and the 
hospitals have to duplicate the system, one for the suspected 
cases and another one for the proven cases, without affecting 
the usual functioning of the hospital. It is equally important to 
educate all the hospital staff and the patients about the 
pandemic, its implications, and the hospital's action plan to 
avoid confusion and panic. 
b. Health clinics  
It will be useful to have a separate room to see the suspected 
patients with proper PPE. However, that requires a proper triage 
area and adequate facilities for the same. It is not practical in 
most of the small clinics to have such a system. Patients should 
be educated about the importance of attending a higher facility 
if they have suspected symptoms, using banners and posters 
outside the small clinics. The HCWs in the clinics should take 
adequate protective measures, as mentioned before. Polyclinics, 
where multiple doctors share the same room at different times 
of the day, need to be avoided as that can turn out to be a crucial 
contamination point. Also, remember that each HCW should be 
operating in a single institution during this pandemic period 
because of the reasons we discussed before. 
     In such a demanding unprecedented pandemic era, to be safe 
and provide safety, we need to follow a principle-based 
practical approach based on scientific evidence. 


















































































































COVID 19 RT-PCR 
*Probable symptoms of COVID 19 includes Fever, running nose, sneezing, dyspnoea, cough etc. But if the clinical presentation is highly suggestive of 
COVID 19 infection, evaluation for the same should be ordered from the 'fever clinic' without delay.  
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Abbreviation  
COVID 19: Coronavirus; HCW: Health Care Workers; PPE: 
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